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ABSTRACT
The idea of applying machine learning(ML) to solve prob-
lems in security domains is almost 3 decades old. As infor-
mation and communications grow more ubiquitous and more
data become available, many security risks arise as well as
appetite to manage and mitigate such risks. Consequently,
research on applying and designing ML algorithms and sys-
tems for security has grown fast, ranging from intrusion de-
tection systems(IDS) and malware classification to security
policy management(SPM) and information leak checking.
In this paper, we systematically study the methods, algo-
rithms, and system designs in academic publications from
2008-2015 that applied ML in security domains. 98% of the
surveyed papers appeared in the 6 highest-ranked academic
security conferences and 1 conference known for pioneering
ML applications in security. We examine the generalized
system designs, underlying assumptions, measurements, and
use cases in active research. Our examinations lead to 1) a
taxonomy on ML paradigms and security domains for fu-
ture exploration and exploitation, and 2) an agenda detail-
ing open and upcoming challenges. Based on our survey,
we also suggest a point of view that treats security as a
game theory problem instead of a batch-trained ML prob-
lem. Keywords: Security, Machine Learning, Large-scale
Applications, Game Theory, Security Policy Management
1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Since Dorothy Denning’s seminal 1987 paper on intrusion
detection [1], ML and data mining(DM) have steadily gained
attention in security applications. DARPA’s 1998 network
intrusion detection evaluation [2], and KDD(Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining) Cup’s 1999 chal-
lenge [3, 4] have raised profile of ML in security contexts.
Yet, constrained by hardware and system resources[4], large-
scale ML applications did not receive much attention for
many years.
∗Corresponding authors
In 2008, ACM Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security(CCS) hosted the 1st Artificial Intelligence in
Security(AISec) Workshop, which has since been a dedicated
venue at a top-level security conference for the intersection
of ML and security. From 2008, the pace of research and
publicity of ML in security started to accelerate in academic
communities (section 2.3), and industry venues (e.g. Black
Hat, RSA) also shifted interests. For instance, ML in secu-
rity was still a topic of minority interest at Black Hat USA
2014 in August [5], but at RSA 2016 in February, the ma-
jority of vendors claimed to deploy ML in their products
[6]. A part of this shift may be motivated by the sudden
increase in blackswan events like the discovery of CRIME,
BEAST and Heartbleed vulnerabilities. The discovery of
these vulnerabilities suggest that organizations may be at-
tacked via previously unknown classes of attacks. To defend
against these types of attacks requires monitoring not just
for known vectors attacks, but also for behavior suggestive of
a compromised machine. The latter requires the gathering
and analysis of much larger sets of data.
Advances in hardware and data processing capacities en-
abled large-scale systems. With increasing amount of data
from growing numbers of information channels and devices,
the analytic tools and intelligent behaviors provided by ML
becomes increasingly important in security. With DARPA’s
Cyber Grand Challenge final contest looming [7], research
interest in ML and security is becoming even more conspic-
uous. Now is the crucial time to examine research works
done in ML applications and security. To do so, we studied
the state-of-art of ML research in security between 2008 and
early 2016, and systematize this research area in 3 ways:
1. We survey cutting-edge research on applied ML in se-
curity, and provide a high-level overview taxonomy of
ML paradigms and security domains.
2. We point to research challenges that will improve, en-
hance, and expand our understanding, designs, and
efficacy of applying ML in security.
3. We emphasize a position which treats security as a
game theory problem.
2. OVERVIEW: STRUCTURE & SCOPE
While we realize there are different ways to classify existing
security problems based on purpose, mechanism, targeted
assets, and point of flow of the attack, our SoK’s section
structure is based on the “Security and Privacy” category of
2012 ACM Computing Classification System[8], which is a
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Figure 1: Generalization of surveyed ML System Designs in Security; details in section 2.1
combination of specific use cases(e.g. malware, phishing),
technique (e.g. information flow), and targeted assets(e.g.
web application, proxies). We present the state-of-art ML
applications in security as the following: Section 3 and Table
2 & 3 discusses Network Security1, Section 4 and Table 4
surveys Security Services, Section 5 and Table 5 specifies
advances in Software & Applications Security, Section 6 and
Table 6 & 7 lays out taxonomy for System Security, and
Section 7 and Table 8, 9 & 10 summarizes progress since
2008 in Malware Detection, IDS, and Social Engineering.
Throughout the survey, we share our frameworks for ML
system designs, assumptions, and algorithm deployments in
security.
We focus our survey on security applications and security-
related ML and AI problems on the defense side, hence our
scope excludes theories related to security such as differen-
tial privacy and privacy-preservation in ML algorithms[9,
10, 11], and excludes ML applications in side channel at-
tacks such as [12, 13, 14]. Partly because there is already a
2013 SoK on evolution of Sybil defense[15] in online social
networks(OSN), and partly because we would like to leave it
as a small exercise to our readers, we excluded Sybil defense
schemes in OSN as well[16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. Still with a broad
base, we propose an alternative position to frame security
issues, and we also recommend a taxonomy for ML applica-
tions in security use cases. Yet, we do not conclude with a
terminal list of “right” or “correct” approaches or methods.
We believe that the range of the applications is too wide to
fit into one singular use case or analysis framework. Instead,
we intend this paper as a systematic design and method
overview of thinking about researching and developing ML
algorithms and applications, that will guide researchers in
their problem domains on an individual basis. We target our
work to security researchers and practitioners, so we assume
that our readers have general knowledge for key security do-
mains and awareness of common ML algorithms, and we also
define terms when needed.
We agree with assessment of top conferences in [21]2. We
1All papers are listed in chronological order with the first
author’s last name followed by venue acronym and year.
2We use the same conference-ranking websites to first
decide our list of top-level conferences:(1)Microsoft
Academic Search - Top Conferences in Security &
Privacyhttp://academic.research.microsoft.com/
RankList?entitytype=3&topDomainID=2&subDomainID=2,
(2)Guofei Gu - Computer Security Conference Ranking
and Statistichttp://faculty.cs.tamu.edu/guofei/sec_
systematically went through all proceedings between 2008
and early 2016 of the top 6 network- and computer-security
conferences to collect relevant papers. Because of KDD’s
early and consistent publication record on ML applications
in Security, and its status as a top-level venue for ML and
DM applications, we also include KDD’s 2008-2015 proceed-
ings. To demonstrate the wide-ranging research attention
drawn to ML applications in security, we also added chosen
selections from the workshop AISec, International Confer-
ence on Machine Learning(ICML), Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems(NIPS), and Internet Measurement Confer-
ence(IMC) papers between 2008-2015, mostly in the “Future
Development” section.
2.1 ML System Designs in Security
Figure 1 shows the generalization of ML system designs
when applied in security, that emerged from our survey of
the papers(the legend is on the figure’s bottom left). In dif-
ferent use cases, the system components may embody differ-
ent names, but their functionalities and positions are cap-
tured in the figure. For example:
1. Knowledge base is baseline of known normality and/or
abnormality, depending on use cases, they include but
are not limited to blacklist(BL), whitelist(WL), watch-
list; known malware signatures, system traces, and
their families; initial set of malicious web pages; ex-
isting security policies or rules, etc..
2. Data sources are where relevant data is collected.
They can be either off-line or live online data feed, e.g.
malware traces collected after execution(off-line), URL
stream(online).
3. Training data are labeled data which are fed to classi-
fiers in training. They can be standard research datasets,
new data(mostly from industry) labeled by human,
synthetic datasets, or a mix.
4. Pre-processor and feature extractor construct fea-
tures from data sources, for example: URL aggrega-
tors, graph representations, SMTP header extractions,
n-gram model builders.
conf_stat.htm, and (3) Jianying Zhou - Top Crypto and
Security Conferences Ranking http://icsd.i2r.a-star.
edu.sg/staff/jianying/conference-ranking.html. All
3 rankings have the same top 6, and because Crypto and
Eurocrypt do not have papers within our focus, we decided
on these 4: ACM CCS, IEEE S&P(hereafter “SP”), NDSS,
and USENIX Security(hereafter “Sec” or “USENIX”)
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Supervised Semi-supervised Unsupervised HITL Game Theory
Attacker Type
Passive 3.1/4/5/6.1/6.2/7.1/7.2/7.3 5/6.1/7.2 3.1/3.2/5/6.1/6.2/7.1/7.2 5/6.1
Semi-aggressive 3.1/3.2/4/5/6.1/6.2/7.1/7.2/7.3 7.1/7.3 3.1/5 6.2
Active 7.1 6.2/7.2
Means of Attack
Server 6.1/7.2 7.2 6.2
Network 3.1/3.2/5/7.2/7.3 5/7.3 3.1/3.2/6.1/7.1 6.2
Client app 5 5 5/6.1
User 3.1/4/7.2/7.3 7.2 4/7.2 7.2
Client machine 6.1/6.2/7.1 6.1/7.1 6.2/7.1
Purpose of Attack [22, 23]
Confidentiality 4/5/6.1/7.2 4/6.2/7.2
Availability 3.1/6.2/7.3 7.2 3.1 6.2/7.2
Integrity 3.2/5/6.1/6.2/7.1/7.2/7.3 5/6.1/7.1/7.2/7.3 3.2/5/6.1/7.1/7.2 5/6.1
Table 1: Overview matrix of sections covering ML paradigms and security domains; details in section 2.2
Dynamic analyzer and static analyzer are used most often
in malware-related ML tasks, and human feedback loop is
added when the system’s design intends to be semi-supervised
or human-in-the-loop(HITL).
2.2 ML Paradigms in Security Problems
Table 1 shows a matrix with rows indicating different ways
of classifying the security problems, and the columns show-
ing well-understood ML paradigms. Based on the threat
models and modeling purposes presented in the papers, we
qualitatively group the attacker into three groups. If there
are multiple attacker types in one section, the section’s num-
bering appears multiple times accordingly.
1. Passive attackers make no attempt to evade detec-
tions; their behaviors fit into descriptions of the threat
models.
2. Semi-aggressive attackers have knowledge of the de-
tectors, and only attempt to evade detections.
3. Active attackers do not only have knowledge of the
detectors and attempt to evade detections, but also
actively try to poison, mislead, or thwart detection.
4. Knowledge of attackers, is the information in at least
one of the five aspects: the learning algorithms them-
selves, the algorithms’ feature spaces, the algorithm’s
parameters, training and evaluation data - regardless
of being labeled or not - used by the algorithms, and
decision feedback given by the algorithms [23, 24, 25].
Influenced by [22, 23], we extend their definitions, and qual-
itatively categorize attackers’ primary purpose as to com-
promise confidentiality, availability or integrity of legitimate
systems, services, and users.
1. Attacks on confidentiality compromise the confiden-
tial or secret information of systems, services, or users
(e.g. password crackers).
2. Attacks on availability make systems and services un-
usable with unwanted information, requests, or many
errors in defense schemes (e.g. DDoS, spam).
3. Attacks on integrity masquerade maliciously inten-
tions as benign intentions in systems, services, and
users (e.g. malware).
We also define ML paradigms shown in the matrix:
1. Supervised learning uses labeled data for training.
2. Semi-supervised learning uses both labeled and un-
labeled data for training.
3. Unsupervised learning has no labeled data available
for training.
4. Human-in-the-loop(HITL) learning incorporates ac-
tive human feedback to algorithm’s decisions into the
knowledge base and/or algorithms.
5. Game Theory(GT)-based learning considers learn-
ing as a series of strategic interactions between the
model learner and actors with conflicting goals. The
actors can be data generators, feature generators, chaotic
human actors, or a combination[23, 24, 26, 27, 28].
For ”Means of Attacks” in Table 1, server, network, and
user are straightforward and intuitive, so here we only de-
scribe “client app” and “client machine”. Client app is any
browser-based means of attack on any client device, and
client machine is any non-browser-based means of attack
on any client device.
As shown in Table 1, the majority of surveyed papers in dif-
ferent security domains use supervised learning to deal with
passive or semi-aggressive attackers. However, the core re-
quirement of supervised learning - labeled data - is not al-
ways viable or easy to obtain, and authors have repeatedly
written about the difficulty of obtaining labeled data for
training. Based on this observation, we conclude that explor-
ing semi-supervised and unsupervised learning approaches
would expand the research foundation of ML applications in
security domains, because semi-supervised and unsupervised
learning can utilize unlabeled datasets which had not been
used by supervised learning approaches before.
Moreover, during our survey, we realized that many ML ap-
plications in security assume that training and testing data
come from the same distribution (in statistical terms, this is
the assumption of stationarity). However, in the real world,
it is highly unlikely that data are stationary, let alone that
the data could very well be generated by an adversarial data
generator producing training and/or testing data sets, as the
case in [26], or simply be generated responding to specific
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Supervised Semi-supervised Unsupervised HITL Game Theory
Attacker Type
Passive 58(49%) 7(5.9%) 24(20%) 2(1.7%) 0(0%)
Semi-aggressive 18(15%) 4(3.4%) 3(2.5%) 0(0%) 1(0.85%)
Active 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(1.7%)
Means of Attack
Server 4(3.4%) 1(0.85%) 1(0.85%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
Network 17(14.4%) 4(3.4%) 11(9.3%) 0(0%) 1(0.85%)
Client app 4(3.4%) 0(0%) 1(0.85%) 2(1.7%) 0(0%)
User 31(26%) 2(1.7%) 9(7.6%) 0(0%) 2(1.7%)
Client machine 20(17%) 4(3.4%) 5(4.2%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
Purpose of Attack [22, 23]
Confidentiality 16(13.6%) 0(0%) 7(6%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
Availability 9(7.6%) 1(0.85%) 5(4.2%) 0(0%) 3(2.5%)
Integrity 51(43.2%) 10(8.5%) 15(12.7%) 2(1.7%) 0(0%)
Table 2: Overview matrix of sections covering ML paradigms and security domains. Number in each box is
the number of papers in our survey that belongs to the category, followed by a parenthesis with the percentage
of the number among all counted papers.
models as in [29]. Our observation from the comprehen-
sive survey confirmed [23]’s statement, and we propose that
GT-based learning approaches and HITL learning system de-
signs should be explored more, in order to design more ef-
ficient security defense mechanisms to deal with active and
unpredictable adversaries. At the same time, human knowl-
edge and judgment in HTIL should go beyond feature en-
gineering, to providing feedback to decisions made by ML
models. Some theory-leaning papers have modeled spam
filtering as Bayesian games or Stackelberg games[26, 29].
Use cases in data sampling, model training with poisoned
or low-confidence data have also been briefly explored in
literature[27, 30, 31].
2.3 Timeline of ML in Security
Based on seminal works and establishments in notable venues,
the gradually increasing levels of interest in ML research ap-
plied to Security is fairly visible. Here we gathered some
milestone events:
1. 1987: Denning published “An Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem” [1], first framing security as a learning problem
2. 1998: DARPA IDS design challenge[2]
3. 1999: KDD Cup IDS design challenge[3, 4]
4. 2008: CCS hosted the 1st AISec workshop. Continues
to operate each year[9]
5. 2007, 2008: Twice, KDD hosted the International Work-
shop on Privacy, Security, and Trust(PinKDD)[32]
6. 2010, 2012: Twice, KDD hosted Intelligence and Se-
curity Informatics Workshop(ISI)[33, 34]
7. 2011: “Adversarial Machine Learning”published in 4th
AISec[23]
8. 2012: “Privacy and Cybersecurity: The Next 100 Years”
by Landwehr et al published[35]
9. 2013: Manifesto from Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop
published as “Machine Learning Methods for Com-
puter Security” by Joseph et al [36].
10. 2014: KDD hosted its 1st “Security & Privacy” session
in the main conference program[37]
11. 2014: ICML hosted its 1st, and so far the only work-
shop on Learning, Security, and Privacy(LSP)[38]
12. 2016: AAAI hosted its 1st Artificial Intelligence for
Cyber Security workshop(AISC)[39]
2.4 Related Work
Despite the surge of research interests and industry appli-
cations in the intersection of ML and security, few surveys
or overviews were published after 2008, the watershed year
of increasing interest in this particular domain. In 2013
[40]surveyed server-side web application security, [41] sur-
veyed data mining applied to security in the cloud focusing
on intrusion detection, [42] discussed an ML perspective in
network anomaly detection. While they are helpful and in-
formative, the former two are limited by their scope and
perspective, and the latter serves as a textbook, hence ab-
sent the quintessential of survey - mapping the progresses
and charting the state-of-art. A collection of papers in 2002
and 2012 [43] discussed applications of DM in computer se-
curity, but lacks a systematic survey on ML applications in
resolving security issues. [44] briefly compared two network
anomaly detection techniques, but limited in scope. [45] of
2009 conducted a comprehensive survey in anomaly detec-
tion techniques, some involving discussions of security do-
mains. The Dagstuhl Manifesto in 2013 [36] articulated the
status quo and looked to the future of ML in security, but
the majority of the literature listed were published before
2008. [46] of 2010 highlighted use cases and challenges for
ML in network intrusion detection, but did not incorporate
a high-level review of ML in security in recent years.
3. NETWORK SECURITY
3.1 Botnets and Honeypots
Research works on botnets among our surveyed literature
focuses mainly on designing systems to detect command-
and-control(C&C) botnets, where many bot-infected ma-
chines are controlled and coordinated by few entities to carry
out malicious activities[47, 48, 49]. Those systems need to
learn decision boundaries between human and bot activities,
therefore ML-based classifiers are at the core of those sys-
tems, and are often trained by labeled data in supervised
learning environments. The most popular classifier is sup-
port vector machines(SVMs) with different kernels, while
spatial-temporal time series analysis and probabilistic in-
ferences are also notable techniques employed in ML-based
classifiers. Topic clustering, mostly seen in natural language
processing(NLP), is used to build a large-scale system to
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identify bot queries [50]. In botnet detection literature, 3
core assumptions are widely shared:
1. Botnet protocols are mostly C&C [47, 48, 51]
2. Individual bots within same botnets behave similarly
and can be correlated to each other [51, 52]
3. Botnet behaviors are different and distinguishable from
legitimate human user, e.g. human behaviors are more
complex[53, 54, 55]
Other stronger assumptions include that bots and humans
interact with different server groups [56], and content fea-
tures from messages generated by bots and human are inde-
pendent [53]. While classification techniques differ, WLs,
BLs, hypothesis testing, and a classifier [47, 49, 53] are
usual system components. Attempts have been made to
abstract state machine models of network to simulate real-
world network traffic and create honeypots [57]. Ground
truths are often heuristic [52], labeled by human experts, or
a combination - even at large scale, human labeled ground
truths are used, for example in [55], game masters’ visual
inspections serve as ground truth to detect bots in online
games. In retrospect, the evolution of botnet detection is
clear: from earlier and more straightforward uses of classi-
fication techniques such as clustering and NB, the research
focus has expanded from the last step of classification, to
the important preceding step of constructing suitable met-
rics, that measures and distinguishes bot-based and human-
based activities[50, 55].
3.2 Proxies and DNS
Classifying DNS domains that distribute or host malware,
scams, and malicious content has drawn research interest
especially in passive DNS analysis. There are two main
approaches: reputation system[58, 59, 60] and classifier[61,
62]. Reputation system scores benign and malicious domains
and DNS hosts, and a ML-based classifier learns bound-
aries between the two. Nonetheless, both reputation system
and classifier use various decision trees, random forest(RF),
na¨ıve Bayes(NB), SVM, and clustering techniques for mostly
supervised learning-based scoring and classification. Many
features used are from protocols and network infrastruc-
tures, e.g. border gateway protocol(BGP) and updates, au-
tomated systems(AS), registration, zone, hosts, and public
BLs. Similar to botnet detectors, variations of BL, WL,
and honeypots[63] are used in similar functions as knowledge
bases, while ground truths are often taken from public BLs,
limited WLs, and anti-virus(AV) vendors such as McAfee
and Norton [58, 59, 61]. But before any ML attempts take
place, most studies would assume the following:
1. Malicious uses of DNS are distinct and distinguishable
from legitimate DNS services.
2. The data collection process - regardless of different
names such as data flow, traffic recorder, or packet as-
sembler - follows a centralized model. In other words,
all the traffic/data/packets flow through certain cen-
tral node or nodes to be collected.
Stronger assumptions include that AS hijackers cannot ma-
nipulate AS path before it reaches them[60], and malicious-
ness will trigger an accurate IP address classifier to fail[64].
Besides analyzing the status quo, [64, 65, 66] showed efforts
to preemptively protect network measurement integrity and
predict potentially malicious activities from web domains
and IP address spaces.
4. SECURITY SERVICES
Both offense and defense for access control, authentication,
and authorization reside within the domain of Security Ser-
vices. Defeating audio and visual CAPTCHAs(Completely
Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Hu-
mans Apart)[67, 68, 68, 69, 70], cracking passwords[71, 72,
73], measuring password strengths[72, 74, 75], and uncov-
ering anonymity[76, 77, 78, 79] are 4 major use cases. On
the offense, specialized ML domains such as computer vi-
sion, signal processing, and NLP automate attacks on user
authentication services i.e. textual or visual passwords and
CAPTCHAs, and uncover hidden identities and services. On
the defense side, entropy-based and ML-based systems cal-
culate password strengths. Other than traditional user au-
thentication schemes, behavioral metrics of users are also
introduced. Following the generalized ML pipeline shown in
Figure 1, the “classifier” is replaced by “recognition engine”
in the password cracking process, and “user differentiation
engine” in authentic metric engineering [80, 81]. Hence the
process becomes: “Data source→ Pre-process & feature ex-
traction→ Recognition or user differentiation engine→ De-
cision” for ML-based security services. A noteworthy trend
to observe, is that attacks on CAPTCHAs are getting more
generalized - from utilizing SVM in 2008 to attack a specific
type of text CAPTCHA[67], in 2015 a generic attach ap-
proach to attack text-based CAPTCHA [70] was proposed.
ML-based attacks on textual and visual CAPTCHA typi-
cally follow the 4-step process:
1. Segmentation: e.g. signal to noise ratio(SNR) for au-
dio; hue, color, value(HSV) for visual [67, 69, 70, 82]
2. Signal or image representation: e.g. discrete Fourier
transformation(audio)[82], letter binarization(visual) [70]
3. Feature extraction: e.g. spectro-temporal features, char-
acter strokes [67, 82]
4. Recognition: K-nearest neighbor(KNN), SVM(RBF ker-
nel), convolutional neural networks(CNN) [68, 71]
On the side of password-related topics in security services,
there are 2 password models: whole-string Markov mod-
els, and template-based models [73]. Concepts in statistical
language modeling, such as natural language encoder and n-
grams associated with Markov models(presented as directed
graphs with nodes labeled by n-grams), and context-free
grammars are common probabilistic foundations to build
password strength meters and password crackers [71, 72, 82].
5. SOFTWARE&APPLICATION SECURITY
ML research in software and applications security mostly
concentrate on web application security in our survey, and
have used supervised learning to train popular classifiers
such as NB and SVM to detect web-based malware and
JavaScript(JS) code[83, 84], filter unwanted resources and
requests such as malicious advertisements[85, 86, 87, 88],
predict unwanted resources and requests(e.g. future black-
listed websites)[89, 90, 91], and quantify web application
vulnerabilities[92]. While [91] explored building web appli-
cation anomaly detector with scarce training data, most use
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cases follow the supervised paradigm assuming plentiful la-
beled data: Data source(web applications, static/dynamic
analyzers)→ feature extraction(often with specific pre-filter,
metrics, and de-obfuscator if needed) → classifiers trained
with labeled data. Apart from this supervised setting, if a
human expert’s feedback is added after classifiers’ decisions[85],
it forms a semi-supervised system. Regardless of system
designs, the usual assumption holds: malicious activities
or actors are different from normal and benign ones likely
do not change much. The knowledge bases of normality
and abnormality can vary, from historical regular expression
lists[86] to other publicly available detectors[84]. Graph-
based algorithms[87] and image recognition[90] are both used
in resource filtering, but in detecting JS malware and eva-
sions and quantifying leaks, having suitable measurements
of similarities is a significant focal point. Indeed, from [83,
84, 92], ML-based classifiers do well in finding similarities
between mutated malicious code snippets, while the same
code pieces could evade static or dynamic analyzer detec-
tions.
6. SYSTEM SECURITY
6.1 Vulnerability and Policy Management
As Landwehr noticed[93], ML can be applied in SPM. How-
ever, in automatic fingerprinting of operating systems(OS),
C4.5 decision tree, SVM, RF, KNN - some most commonly
used ML-based classifiers in security - failed to distinguish
remote machine instances with coarse- and fine-grained dif-
ferences, as the algorithms cannot exploit semantic knowl-
edge of protocols or send multi-packet probes [94]. Yet by
taking advantage of semantic and syntactic features, plus
semi-supervised system design, [95, 96, 97] showed that SVM(optimized
by sequential minimal optimization[SMO] algorithm), KNN,
and NLP techniques do well in Android SPM. On the other
hand, in vulnerability management, [98, 99, 100, 101, 102],
clustering techniques have done well in predicting future in-
cidents and infer vulnerability patterns in code, as well as
NB, SVM, and RF in ranking risks and identifying proper
permission levels. Both vulnerability management and SPM
also focus on devising proper metrics for ML applications:
from heuristics based on training set [100], Jaro distance
[101], to outside reputation system oracles [99], metrics are
needed to compare dependency graphs, string similarities,
and inferred vulnerability patterns. In most use cases, be-
cause of the need for labeled data to train supervised learn-
ing systems, many systems follow the generalized training
process in Figure 1: “Knowledge base → offline trainer →
online or offline classifier”. When policy management deci-
sions need feedback, a HITL design is in place where end
human users’ feedback is directed to knowledge base. One
distinguishing tradition in ML applications research in this
domain, is a strong emphasis on measurement - selecting
or engineering proper similarity or scoring metrics are often
important points of discussion in research literature. From
earlier uses of heuristics in clustering algorithms, to more
recent semantic connectivity measurement applied in semi-
supervised systems, both the metrics and the system de-
signs for vulnerability and security policy management have
evolved to not only identify, but also to infer and predict
future vulnerable instances.
6.2 Information Flow and DDoS
Compared to other security domains, ML research in in-
formation flow and DDoS focus more on evasion tactics and
limits of ML systems in adversarial environments. Hence we
grouped together the two sub-domains, and marked stud-
ies in Table 7 with “(IF)” and “(DDoS)” accordingly. For
DDoS[27, 103, 104], the usual assumption is that patterns
of attack and abuse traffic are different from normal traffic
[103], but [104] challenged it by proposing an adversary who
can generate attributes that look as plausible as actual at-
tributes in benign patterns, and caused failure in ML-based
automated signature generation to distinguish benign and
malicious byte sequences. Then, [27] introduced GT to eval-
uate DDoS attack and defense in real-world. For informa-
tion flow[24, 105, 106, 107], assumptions can take various
forms. In PDF classifiers based on document structural fea-
tures, it is malicious PDF has different document structures
than good PDFs [105]; in Android privacy leak detector, it is
the majority of an Android application’s semantically similar
peers has similar privacy disclosure scenarios[106]. But [24]
poses semi-aggressive and active attackers with some infor-
mation about the data, feature sets, and/or algorithms, and
then attackers successfully evade ML-based PDF classifiers.
Another example is, PDF malware could be classified [105],
and then a generic and automated evasion technique based
on genetic programming is successfully experimented[107].
Overall, while using SVM, RF, and decision trees trained
with labeled data to detect and predict DDoS and malicious
information and data flows, ML applications in information
flow and DDoS challenge the usual assumption of station-
ary adversary behaviors. From collecting local information
only, to proposing a general game theory-based framework
to evaluate DDoS attacks and defense, and from using static
method to detect malicious PDF file to generic automated
evasion, the scope of ML applications in both DDoS and IF
have expanded and generalized over the years.
7. MALWARE, SOCIAL ENGINEERING &
IDS
7.1 Malware Detection and Mitigations
Program-centric or system-centric, there are 3 areas that
draw most ML application research attention in malware:
malware detection[108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116,
117, 118, 119], classifying unknown malware into families[31,
120, 121, 122, 123, 124], and auto-extract program or proto-
col specifications [125, 126, 127]. Realizing the signature
and heuristic-based malware detectors can be evaded by
obfuscation and polymorphism [118], more behavior-based
matching and clustering systems and algorithms have been
researched. Figure 1 already shows a generalized ML system
design for malware detection and classification, and a more
detailed description is below:
1. Collect malware artifacts and samples, analyze them,
execute them in a controlled virtual environment to
collect traces, system calls, API calls, etc. [116, 119,
122] 3. Or, directly use information from already com-
pleted static and/or dynamic analyses.
3We direct our readers for more details in [21], which eval-
uated rigor and prudence of academic research up to 2011
that rely on malware execution, and provided a guide rubric
for safety for handling malware datasets
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2. Decide or devise similarity measurements between gen-
eralized binaries, system call graphs(SCG), function
call graphs(FCG), etc., then extract features [120, 121,
124, 126]
3. Classify malware artifacts into families in-sample, or
cluster them with known malware families. The clas-
sifiers and clustering engines are usually trained with
labeled data[58, 118, 123]. Popular ones are SVM and
RF for classification, and hidden Markov model(HMM)
and KNN alongside different clustering techniques.
Even in the use case of auto-extract specifications, super-
vised learning with labeled data is needed when behavior
profiles, state machine inferences, fuzzing, and message clus-
tering are present. Evasion techniques of detectors and poi-
soning of ML algorithms are also discussed, and typical eva-
sion techniques include obfuscation, polymorphism, mimicry,
and reflecting set generation[24, 113]. Malware detection
and matching based on structural information and behavior
profiles[118, 120, 124] show a tendency to use graph-based
clustering and detection algorithms, and similarity measure-
ment used in these algorithms have ranged from Jaccard dis-
tance to new graph-based matching metrics. While cluster-
ing techniques have been mostly used in malware detection,
a nearest neighbor technique is explored to evade malware
detection.
7.2 Social Engineering: Phishing, Malicious
Content and Behaviors
Spams, malicious webpages and URLs that redirect or mis-
lead un-suspecting users to malware, scams, or adult con-
tent [66] is perhaps as old as civilian use of the Internet.
Research literature mostly focus on 3 major areas: detect-
ing phishing malicious URLs[128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133],
filtering spam or fraudulent content [26, 29, 134, 135, 136,
137, 138, 139, 140, 141], and detecting malicious user ac-
count behaviors[142, 143, 144, 145, 146]. Moreover, because
phishing 4 is a classic social engineering tactic, it is often the
gateway of many studies to detect malicious URLs, spam,
and fraudulent content. To identify malicious URLs, ML-
based classifiers draw features from webpage content(lexical,
visual, etc.), URL lexical features, redirect paths, host-based
features, or some combinations of them. Such classifiers usu-
ally act in conjunction with knowledge bases which are usu-
ally in-browser URL BLs or from web service providers. If
the classifier is fed with URL-based features, it is common
to set an URL aggregator as a pre-processor before extract-
ing features. Mostly using supervised learning paradigm,
NB, SVM with different kernels, and LR are popular ML
classifiers for filtering spam and phishing. Meanwhile, GT-
based learning to deal with active attackers is also eval-
uated in spam filtering. [26] evaluates a Bayesian game
model where the defense is not fully informed of the at-
tacker’s objectives and the active adversary can exercise con-
trol over data generation, [29] proposes a Stackelberg game
where spammer reacts to the learner’s moves. Stronger as-
sumptions also exist: for example, [139] assumes spammers’
4We agree with [131]’s definition of phishing: “without per-
mission, alleges to act on behalf of a third party with the
intention of confusing viewers into performing an action with
which the viewer would only trust a true agent of the third
party”
phone blocks follow a beta distribution as conjugate prior
for Bernoulli and binomial distribution. Another social en-
gineering tactic is spoofing identities with fake or compro-
mised user accounts, and detection of such malicious behav-
iors utilize features from user profiles, spatial-, temporal-,
and spatial-temporal patterns, and user profiles are used in
particular to construct normality. Graph representation and
trust propagation models are also deployed to distinguish
genuine and malicious accounts with different behavior and
representations[144, 145, 146]. Tracing the chronology of
applying ML to defend against social engineering, one trend
is clear: while content-, lexical-, and syntactic-based fea-
tures are still being widely used, constructing graph repre-
sentations and exploring temporal patterns of redirect paths,
events, accounts, and behaviors have been on the rise as
feature spaces for ML applications in defend against social
engineering efforts. Accordingly, the ML techniques have
also changed from different classification schemes to graphic
models. It is also noteworthy that in [29, 146], addressing
adversarial environments’ challenges to ML systems is elabo-
rated as primary research areas, instead of a short discussion
point.
7.3 IDS
From feature sets to algorithms and systems, IDS has been
extensively studied. However, as [147] cautioned, ML can
be easily conflated with anomaly detection. While both are
applied to build IDS, important difference is that ML aims
to generalize expert-defined distinctions, but anomaly de-
tection focuses on finding unusual patterns, while attacks
are not necessarily anomalous. For example, [148] distin-
guished n-gram model’s different use cases: anomaly de-
tection uses it to construct normality(hence more appro-
priate when no attack is available for learning), and ML
classifiers learn to discriminate between benign and mali-
cious n-grams(hence more appropriate when more labeled
data is present). Since 2008, works at top venues have
added to the rigor for ML applications in IDS. For exam-
ple, a common assumption of IDS is: Anomalous or ma-
licious behaviors or traffic flows are fundamentally differ-
ent from normal ones, but [147] challenges the assumption
by studying low-cardinality intrusions where attackers don’t
send a large number of probes. To address adversarial learn-
ing environment and minimal labels in training data, semi-
supervised paradigms, especially active learning, are also
used[147, 149]. Heterogeneous designs of IDS in different use
cases give rise to many ad-hoc evaluations in research works,
and a reproducibility and comparison framework was pro-
posed to address the issue[150]. Meanwhile, techniques such
as graph-based community detection[151], time series-based
methods[152, 153], and generalized support vector data de-
scription in cyber-physical system and adversarial environ-
ment for auto-feature selection[154], have also emerged. Al-
though they carry different assumptions of normality and
feature representations, the supervised ML system design re-
mains largely the same. Besides the fact the more techniques
and use cases have been proposed, the focus of research in
IDS had evolved from discovering new techniques and use
cases, to rigorously evaluating fundamental assumptions and
workflows of IDS. For example, while feature selection has
stayed as a major component, there are re-examination of
assumptions and measurements on what constitutes normal-
ity and abnormality[151], alternative to more easily acquire
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data and use low-confidence data for ML systems[149], and
proposal on validating reproducibility of results from differ-
ent settings[150].
8. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
One key goal of our SoK survey is to help researchers look
into the future. ML applications in security domains are
attracting academic research attention as well as industrial
interest, and this presents a valuable opportunity for re-
searchers to navigate the landscapes between ML theories
and security applications. There are also opportunities to
explore if there are some types of ML paradigms that are
especially well suited to particular security problems. Apart
from highlighting that 1) semi-supervised and unsupervised
ML paradigms are more effective in utilizing unlabeled data,
hence ease the difficulty of obtaining labeled data, and 2)
GT-based ML paradigms and HITL ML system designs will
become more influential in dealing with semi-aggressive and
aggressive attackers, we also share the following seven spec-
ulations of future trends, based on our current SoK.
1. Metric Learning: Measurement has become more
and more conspicuous for ML research in security, mostly
in similarity measurement for clustering algorithms[53,
65, 76, 120]. Proper measurements and metrics are also
used to construct ground truths to evaluate ML-based
classifiers, and also have important roles in feature
engineering[55, 140, 155, 156]. Given the ubiquitous
presence of metrics and the complex nature of con-
structing them, ML applications in security will bene-
fit much from metric learning.
2. NLP: Malicious content, spam, and malware analy-
sis and detections have used tools from statistical lan-
guage modeling(e.g. n-gram-based representation for
strings in code and HTTP request)[62, 74, 116, 138,
141, 157], As textual information explodes, NLP will
become more widely used beyond source filtering and
clustering e.g. [57] use n-gram models to infer state
machines of protocols.
3. Upstream movement of ML in security defense
designs. In malware detection and classifications, behavior-
and signature-based malware classifiers have used in-
puts from static and dynamic binary analysis as features[110,
111, 123, 126], and [112] already shows RNN can be
applied to automatically recognize functions in binary
analysis. We also see ML algorithms applied in vulner-
ability, device, and security policy management, DDoS
mitigation, information flow quantifications, and net-
work infrastructure[103, 106, 116, 141]. Hence, it is
reasonable to expect that more ML systems and algo-
rithms will move upstream in more security domains.
4. Scalability: With increasing amount of data from
growing numbers of information channels and devices,
scale of ML-based security defenses will become a more
important aspect in researching ML applications in
security [12, 50, 109, 131]. As a result, large-scale
systems will enable distributed graph algorithms
in malware analysis, AS path hijacker tracing, cyber-
physical system fault correlation, etc..[49, 56, 72, 96,
106, 118]
5. Specialized probabilistic models will be applied
beyond the context of classifiers, e.g. access control[81].
6. High FP rates have always been a concern for system
architects and algorithm researchers [86, 150]. Reduc-
ing FP rates will grow from an ad-hoc component in
various system designs, to independent formal frame-
works, algorithms, and system designs.
7. Privacy enforcement was framed as a learning prob-
lem recently in [158], in the light of many publications
on privacy-preservation in ML algorithms, and privacy
enhancement by probabilistic models[11, 159, 160, 161,
162, 163]. This new trend will become more prominent.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed ML applications in security do-
mains by surveying literature from top venues of our field
between 2008 and early 2016. We attempted to bring clarity
to a complex field with intersecting expertises by identify-
ing common use cases, generalized system designs, common
assumptions, metrics or features, and ML algorithms ap-
plied in different security domains. We constructed a ma-
trix showing the intersections of ML paradigms and three
different taxonomy structures to classify security domains,
and show that while much research has been done, explo-
rations in GT-based ML paradigms and HITL ML system
designs are still much desired (and under-utilized) in the
context of active attackers. We point out 7 promising areas
of research based on our observations, and argue that while
ML applications can be powerful in security domains, it is
critical to match the ML system designs with the underlying
constraints of the security applications appropriately.
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Table 3: Botnet Detectors
Study Goal System Components ML Techniques
Gu NDSS’08[47] Detect hosts of botnets and
malicious patterns
WL, feature extractor, clustering en-
gine
X-Means clustering
Gianvecchio
NDSS’08[53]
Distinguish between human-
and bot-generated chats
Entropy-based classifier, ML-based
classifier
NB
Gu USENIX’08[52] Network-based anomaly de-
tection for botnet C&C
channels
WL, watch list, protocol matcher,
activity and message response detec-
tor, spatial-temporal correlation en-
gine
sequential probability ration test-
ing(SPRT), hierarchical clustering
Hu NDSS’09[54] Detect redirection botnets BL, WL, resource filtering(content
analysis, URL probing, network
analysis, IP correlation), classifier
Linear SVM, SPRT
Nagaraja
USENIX’10[49]
Find peer-to-peer botnets by
traffic patterns
Traffic monitor honeypot communi-
cations, background traffic collector,
graph preprocess, inference system
Graph clustering
Chen KDD’11[56] Classify bots or human in-
teractions
Flow parser, BL, graph feature ex-
tractor, online classifier
Least squares SVM
Jacob
USENIX’11[48]
Finding C&C connections
from bot traffic
Host-based information, C&C be-
havioral graphs, graphs of known
C&C connections
Graph clustering(metric: non-
induced maximum common sub-
graph)
Jacob
USENIX’12[51]
Detect and contain mali-
cious web crawlers
BL, WL, classifier Ensemble classifier: NB,
SVM(Gaussian radial basis function
“RBF” kernel), association rules
Krueger CCS’12[57] Infer a state machine and
message format of a protocol
from network traffic
Message embedder, cluster, infer-
ence engine, template engine
N-grams, tokens, binomial
test(to reduce dimensionality),
non-negative matrix factoriza-
tion(NMF), Markov model
Zhang NDSS’13 [50] Study bot searches on a
search engine
Feature extraction, pattern tree gen-
eration, topic clustering, classifier
Spectral clustering(metric: Jaccard
distance), single linkage hierarchical
clustering(SLHC)
Lee NDSS’16 [55] Detect game bots in mas-
sively multiplayer online
role-playing games
Game logs, transformation, feature
extraction, metric computing, clas-
sifier
Logistic regression(LR), cosine sim-
ilarity, Hurst exponent, exponential
weighted moving average
Table 4: Proxies and DNS
Study Goal System Components ML Techniques
Small
USENIX’08[63]
Auto-generate responses to mali-
cious requests and harness pay-
loads
Data collection, pre-process, classi-
fier, language model generation
N-grams, Markov model, k-
means iterative clustering,
Needleman-Wunsch string
alignment for contextual de-
pendency, TF/IDF, k-medoids
algorithm
Prakash KDD’09
[164]
Automated BGP updates analyzer
to find anomalies
Data flow, temporal analysis, fre-
quency analysis
Haar wavelet transform, a fre-
quency analysis technique akin
to NB
Qiu
USENIX’09[60]
Locate prefix hijackers by AS path Target monitor, classifier, rank en-
gine
Hierarchical clustering(metric:
similarity of AS level paths to
the prefix), rank by likelihood of
seeing hijacking events
Song
NDSS’09[62]
Detect anomalies in web traffic Packet assembler, WL, feature ex-
tractor, classifier
N-grams feature extraction,
Mixture-of-Markov-Chains
model, K-means clustering
Antonakakis
USENIX’10 [58]
Dynamic reputation system for
DNS
Honeypot, knowledge base, BL, rep-
utation system classifier
Decision tree, logit boost, X-
means clustering
Bilge NDSS’11
[61]
Detect malicious DNS domains
with passive DNS analysis
Traffic recorder, feature extractor,
domain BL, learning module, classi-
fier
C4.5 decision tree
Antonakakis
USENIX’11 [59]
Detect malware domains at upper-
level DNS hierarchy by passive
DNS traffic analysis and global
DNS query resolution
Knowledge base, learning module,
training classifier, and feature extrac-
tor
RF
Fatemieh
NDSS’11 [65]
Protect integrity of measurement
in whitespace networks
Traffic collector, signal propagation,
seed trusted set
SVM(qudratic kernel)
Venkataraman
NDSS’13[64]
Infer evolution of malicious activi-
ties in regions of Internet
Changes in prefixes and IP address
distributions
Decision tree
Vissers NDSS’15
[66]
Classify parked domains Browser-based client side classifier RF
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Table 5: Password Meters & Crackers, and CAPTCHA Breakers
Study Goal Recognition or Classification Engine
Golle CCS’08[67] Asirra CAPTCHA attack SVM(RBF kernel)
Frank
CCS’08[81]
Probabilistic model for role engineering in role-based
control access(RBAC)
Disjoint Decomposition Model(a structural equiv-
alent to infinite relational model), Gibbs sampling
to infer DOM parameters, clustering
Zander
Sec’08[76]
Measurement and sampling techniques to reveal hid-
den services
Remote clock-skew estimation and synchronized
sampling
Weir SP’09[71] Password cracker using probabilistic context-free
grammar
Context-free grammar with information about
probability distribution of user passwords
Bursztein
SP’11[82]
Attack noise-based non-continuous audio CAPTCHA Regularized Least Squares Classification(RLSC)
Zheng CCS’11
[80]
Behavioral metric for user verification by mouse move-
ment
SVM(RBF kernel)
Brusztein
CCS’11[68]
Text-based CAPTCHA strength and weakness. Rec-
ommended engines in different phases of attacks, and
principles for secured CAPTCHAs
SVM(RBF kernel), KNN
Castelluccia
NDSS’12[74]
Password strength meter Markov models built on n-gram database
Narayanan SP’12
[78]
Identify anonymous authors by stylometry on internet
scale
RLSC, linear SVM, NB
Dyer SP’12 [79] Traffic analysis attack against common countermea-
sures
NB, multinomial NB, variable n-gram, SVM
Kelley SP’12 [75] Measure password strength by simulating password-
cracking algorithms
Brute force Markov models
Gao CCS’13 [69] Attack hollow textual CAPTCHAs CNN
Afroz SP’14 [77] Detect multiple identities of anonymous authors Principal component analysis(PCA), L1-
regularized LR, linear SVM
Ma SP’14[73] Study of probabilistic password models Markov models and context-free grammar
Chatterjee SP’15
[72]
Natural language encoder design for cracking-resistant
password vaults
Natural language encoder(NLE)
Freeman
NDSS’16 [25]
Probabilistic model for user authentication at login
time
Probabilistic model
Gao NDSS’16[70] Generic attack model on text-based CAPTCHAs SVM(kernel unspecified), back-propagation neu-
ral network, template matching, CNN
Table 6: Softward and Applications Security
Study Goal System Components ML Techniques and Metrics(if specified)
Zhang Sec’08[87] Predict websites
blacklisted by
browsers
Security logs, pre-filter by knowledge
base, relevance ranking, severity assess-
ing, final BL
Link analysis and rank relevance corre-
lation statistics on weighted undirected
graph
Robertson
NDSS’10[91]
ML-based web app
anomaly detection
with scarce training
data
Knowledge base(local and global), of-
fline and online trained classifier
HMM-encoded probabilistic grammar, ag-
glomerative hierarchical clustering
Chapman
CCS’11[92]
Quantify side chan-
nel leaks from web
apps
Web app, web crawler, metrics and fea-
ture extraction, quantifier(classifier, en-
tropy calculator, Fisher criterion calcu-
lator)
Nearest-centroid(metrics: Total-Source-
Destination, edit distance, random dis-
tance)
Sculley
KDD’11[85]
Detect adversarial
advertisements
Model aggregation, labeled data, strat-
ified sampling, classifier, human moni-
toring feedback
Linear SVM and its variations
Curtsinger
Sec’11[83]
In-browser JS mal-
ware detection
URL BL, scan scripts, code de-
obfuscator, feature extractor, classifier
NB(metric: matched strings)
Lu CCS’11[88] Browser component
to detect malicious
search poisoning
Browser/network/search/user redirec-
tion chain information collector, feature
extractor, classifier
C4.5 decistion tree
Kapravelos
USENIX’13[84]
Detect evasions in
malicious JS
Web information, drive-by-download
detector oracle, syntax tree parser, simi-
larity measurement, pairing, evasion de-
tector
KNN(metric: direct editing distance be-
tween nodes)
Bhagavatula
AISec’14[86]
Auto-block ad re-
sources
Independent classifier(trained with la-
beled datasets)
KNN, experimented with NB,
SVM(polynomial and RBF kernel, LR)
Soska Sec’14[89] Detect vulnerable
websites before
compromise
Websites’ statistics and contents, parser
and filter, dynamic feature extractor,
classifier
C4.5 decision tree ensembles
Borgolte Sec’15
[90]
Detect website de-
facement
URL of website(no prior knowledge
of content or structure of webpages
needed)
Stacked encoder, deep neural network,
image-based object recognition
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Table 7: Vulnerability and Security Policy Management
Study Goal System Components Similarity or Scoring
Metrics
ML Techniques
Makanju
KDD’09[98]
Mine clusters from
event logs for fault
management
3-step partitions, independent
system
Token- and bijection-
based heuristics
Iterative hierarchical clus-
tering
Richardson
AISec’10[94]
Limits of automated
fingerprinting for OS
Probe generator, candidate
probe set, trainer, learner,
feedback loop
Not applicable(NA) C4.5 decision tree, rule
learner, SVM-SMO,
instance-based clustering
Bozorgi
KDD’10[99]
Predict possibil-
ity and timing of
vulnerable exploits
Vulnerability disclosure reports,
feature extractor, offline classi-
fier, online predictor
Common Vulnerabilities
Scoring System(CVSS)
score, distance to
maximum margin
hyperplane
Linear SVM
Peng
CCS’12[100]
Score and rank risks
of Android apps
App meta-information corpus,
trainer, classifier
Heuristics derived from
models
NB(basic and with prior),
a hierarchical Bayesian
model built as an exten-
sion to latent Dirichlet al-
location(LDA)
Pandita
USENIX’13[96]
Identify permission
sentences in mobile
apps
Semantic graph generator and
engine, flow-of-logic engine, an-
notation engine, classifier(with
user feedback loop to build a
knowledge base)
NA Part-of-speech(POS)
tagging, phrase and
clause parsing, named
entity recognition(NER),
semantic graph, typed
dependency
Rasthofer
NDSS’14[95]
Identify sources and
sinks from code of
any Android API
Input, semantic and syntactic
feature matrices, classifier
NA Linear SVM
Yamaguchi
SP’15[101]
Infer vulnerability
search patterns in C
code
Static analyzer, signature gener-
ator, inference engine
Jaro distance Complete-linkage cluster-
ing
Wang
USENIX’15[97]
Semi-supervised
learning for Android
SPM
Knowledge base, classifier,
co-occurrence learner, learning
combiner, policy refinement
generator feedback loop
Semantic pattern-to-
rule distance
KNN(metric: semantic
connectivity between
known and unknown
subjects)
Liu USENIX’15
[102]
Predict future data
leak instances from
network logs
Data collection, BL, feature ex-
tractor, aggregation, training,
classifier
Correlations between
misconfigurations and
malicious activities
RF
Table 8: Information Flow and DDoS
Study Goal System Components ML Techniques
Berra
CCS’08(DDoS)[103]
Detect and predict abnor-
mal traffic patterns in dis-
tributed systems
Local model of information collector,
classifier, learner
NB
Venkataraman
NDSS’08(DDoS)[104]
Limits of pattern-extraction
algorithms in adversarial
setting
Adversary challenges the signature al-
gorithm
Generic proof of bounded FPs and
reflecting set of plausible aprioris
Yan
CCS’12(DDoS)[27]
Framework to evaluate
DDoS attacks and defense
Network state, attacker and defender’s
move spaces, reasonings, decisions
Game theory(semi network-form
game), Bayesian network
Vsrndic
NDSS’13(IF)[105]
Static method to detect ma-
licious PDF files
Hierarchical document structural fea-
ture extractor, classifier
C5.0 decision tree, SVM-RBF
Rndic
SP’14(IF)[24]
Evasion of learning-based
PDF classifier
Attacker’s knowledge of feature sets,
training data, classification algo-
rithms(one or more areas)
SVM(linear and RBF), RF as test
classifiers
Lu
NDSS’15(IF)[106]
Detect privacy leak in data
flow
App information collector, data- and
system-dependence graph, privacy dis-
closure analysis, peer voting engine
Ranking based on TF/IDF and co-
sine similarity representing semantic
similarity
Xu
NDSS’16(IF)[107]
Generic automated evasions
of malicious PDF classifiers
Population initialization, mutation,
variant selection, feedback to popula-
tion
SVM-RBF, RF
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Table 9: Malware Identification, Classification, and Mitigation
Study Goal System Components ML Techniques
Ahmed
CCS’09[119]
Detect malware by Windows
API call traces
Kernel mode hook, knowledge base,
API call trace, feature extractor, train-
ing, classifier
C4.5 decision tree, instance-based
KNN, NB, inductive rule learner,
SVM-SMO
Bayer
NDSS’09[124]
Group similar malwares
from taint source and
control flow
Knowledge base, dynamic analysis,
network analysis, behavior profile gen-
erator, clustering
Locality sensitive hashing(LSH),
single linkage clustering. Met-
ric: Jaccard distance, normalized
compression distance
Comparetti
SP’09[126]
Automated reverse engi-
neering of app layer protocol
specifications
Dynamic analysis, session analysis,
message clustering, state machine in-
ference, labeling, fuzzing
Partitioning around medoids(PAM),
metric: Jaccard index
Kolbitsch
Sec’09[118]
Detect malware at end hosts Knowledge base, program slicing, be-
havioral profile generation, matching
Directed acyclic graph(DAG)
matching algorithms
Lanzi
CCS’10[116]
Diversity of system calls
study(System-centric mal-
ware analysis)
Training dataset, system call sequence
miner
N-gram models
Ye KDD’10[123] Auto-group malware sam-
ples into families with a clus-
ter ensemble
Feature extractor, n-gram slicer, clus-
ter ensemble, signature generator, hu-
man feedback loop
PCA, Ensemble: hierarchical & par-
titional clustering, with weighted
subspace K-medoids
Fredrikson SP’10
[125]
Auto-extraction on specifi-
cations of class of programs
Training datasets, behavior miner, ex-
tracted specifications
Simulated annealing in graph algo-
rithm
Jang
CCS’11[122]
Reduce feature dimensional-
ity for large-scale malware
clustering
Static and dynamic analysis, fingerprit-
ing, scheduler, clustering engine
Feature hashing(metric: Jaccard
similarity), aggolomerative hierar-
chical clustering
Ye KDD’11[117] Detect malware by file rela-
tions
File relation and content collector, fea-
ture extractor, classifier
Customized parametric model on
content and non-parametric one on
relations
Antonakakis
Sec’12[114]
Detect domain generation
algorithm(DGA)-based mal-
wares
Knowledge base, discovery engine,
trainer, classifier within networks
X-means clustering, spectral cluster-
ing, decision tree, hidden Markov
model(HMM)
Rahman
Sec’12[115]
Detect malwares propagated
by social network
User authorization, post crawler,
feature extractor, WL, BL,
train(manually labeled data) clas-
sifier, user feedback
SVM(kernel unspecified)
Kong
KDD’13[120]
Malware classification on
structural information
Labeled set, function call graph(FCG)
extractor, maximum margin distance
learner, ensemble classifier
SVM-Gaussian kernel, KNN (met-
ric: maximum margin-guided simi-
larity between FCGs)
Borgolte
CCS’13[121]
Signature-based malware
clustering
Website parser, DOM tree difference
computation engine, feature extractor,
signature generator
Density-based clustering with or-
dering points(metrics: Shannon en-
tropy, Kolmogorov complexity)
Biggio
AISec’14[31]
Perfect-knowledge attacker
poisoning malware cluster-
ing
Malware instruction set representation,
message embedder, clustering, classifier
Single linkage clustering
Tamersoy
KDD’14[108]
Detect malware by file rela-
tion graphs
File collector, LSH, graph builder, be-
lief propagator
MinHash, LSH, pairwise Markov
random field, unweighted bipartite
graph
Invernizzi
NDSS’14[109]
Detect malware downloads
in networks
Network traffic collector, feature ex-
tractor, distributed classifier
Decision tree(ground truth)
Arp
NDSS’14[110]
Explainable Android mal-
ware detection
Broad static analysis, feature embed-
der, detector, explanation
Linear SVM
Graziano Sec’15
[111]
Detect and forecast mal-
ware samples and trends
from public dynamic analy-
sis sandbox
Dynamic analysis, binary similarity,
fine-grained static analysis, classifier
Logistic model tree
Shin Sec’15[112] Recognize functions in mal-
ware binaries
Binary, fixed-length subsequence ex-
tractor, learner
Recurrent neural network(RNN)
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Hosting properties,
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LR - online gradient de-
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URL lexical, con-
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Stackelberg game
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Learner, data generator, loss func-
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different loss functions
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URLs in streams
Properties of redirect
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ture extraction, training
L2-regularized LR
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Lexical-, syntactic-
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Feature extractor, classifier SVM-SMO, exper-
imented with NB,
SVM-RBF, C4.5, LR
Egele
NDSS’13[142]
Detect compromised
accounts by behavior
change
Temporal behavior
and content patterns
Data collection, labeling, training N-gram model, SVM-
SMO
Großhans
ICML’13[26]
Bayesian game model
in adversarial spam
filtering
Game between a
learner of a model and
a data generator
Learner, data generator(conflicting
but not necessarily adversarial),
cost functions
Bayesian regression
model. Baseline: Nash
regression, robust ridge
regression, regular ridge
regression
Invernizzi SP’13
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Use search engines to
find other malicious
webpages
Content- and link-
based features
Crawler, profiler, search engine’s
BL, initial set of malicious pages
N-grams, term extrac-
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Zhao
KDD’13[133]
Online active learn-
ing for malicious
URL detection
Lexical- and host-
based features
Live data feed, feature collector,
cost-sensitive update, active learn-
ing module, classifier
Customized online active
cost-sensitive algorithm
Jiang Sec’13
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Detect spam cell
numbers
Call detail records Records collector, feature extrac-
tor, classifier
Customized Bayesian
model
Zhang
NDSS’14[140]
Detect auto-
generated web
spam content
Content features Content filter, inverted index en-
gine, clustering
Shingling, POS tag-
ging(metric:Jaccard
index)
Viswanath
Sec’14[143]
Unsupervised
anomalous user
behavior detection
Spatial, temporal,
spatial-temporal
Normality construction, PCA, de-
tection
PCA, KNN
Whalen
AISec’14[141]
Distributed content
anomaly detec-
tion(CAD)
N-gram of payloads Distributed models over applica-
tion servers
Aggregated RF, LR,
Bloom filter
Boshmaf
NDSS’15[144]
Predict benign users
who befriended fake
accounts
User profiles, commu-
nications, activities
history
Graph representation, feature ex-
traction, trust propagation, rank
users
Louvain method for com-
munity detection, modi-
fied random walk
Stringhini
Sec’15[145]
Detect malicious
online accounts ac-
cessed by a common
set of machines
User-agent correlation,
account usage, event
time series
IP mapping, graph representation,
feature extraction, detection
Louvain method
Wang Sec’15[146] Detect adversarial
crowdsourcing
User profile, behav-
iors, temporal patterns
Normality construction, input, fea-
ture extraction, classification
Customized Bayesian
model, SVM(RBF and
polynomial), RF
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Kloft
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Auto-select features for
anomaly detection with
one-class SVM
Different feature sets might be various
characterizations of normality
Generalized support vector data
description(SVDD)
Gornitz
AISec’09[149]
Query low-confidence obser-
vations and expand data ba-
sis with minimal labeling
Anomaly detection is an active learning
task
SVDD
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Non-parametric semi-
supervised network IDS.
Attackers’ behaviors are not necessarily
different from legitimate human users,
e.g. they do not sent large numbers of
probes
Laplacian regularized least
squares(RLS)/Bayesian kernel
model on graphs representing
network flow traffic
Ding KDD’12
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Augment signature-based
system at network edges for
multi-layer IDS
Attackers do not respect community
boundaries and exhibit “anti-social be-
haviors”
Graph-based community detec-
tion
Xie KDD’12 [152] Detect spam review by tem-
poral patterns in adversarial
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Normal reviewers’ arrival patterns are
Poisson and uncorrelated to rating pat-
terns temporally
Multidimensional time se-
ries(matching blocks by longest
common substring algorithm)
Wressnegger
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Use of n-grams in intrusion
detection
Anomaly detection and ML are two dif-
ferent schemes for IDS
Reviewed n-gram models in
both ML and anomaly detection
schemes
Momtazpour
KDD’15[153]
Detect correlated invariants
in cyber-physical systems
Local invariants after filtering can still be
correlated
Latent factor auto regression
with exogenous input to correlate
time series
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NDSS’15[150]
Reproducibility and com-
parison framework for IDS
Uniform distribution approximates the
entire web by Common Crawl URL index
Probablistic model
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